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One of the key questions that naturally arise in discussions of education decentralization is how 
Federal education resources should be allocated among the various states and within states 
among communities or schools. In general, there are two approaches: (a) bilateral negotiations 
between the Federal government and states with little transparency as to the rules; and (b) 
formula-based distribution. This paper shows that, based on econometric analysis on Federal 
education transfers data in Mexico, the former approach can lead to allocation results that appear 
contrary to stated policy objectives like equity improvement and greater social inclusion in 
education. 
 
This paper then argues that contrary to common belief the use of capitation or per student 
allocation can improve not only efficiency but also equity. In this regard, a theoretical model is 
presented to analyze this hypothesis. Several variations of the capitation formula are discussed 
and analysis of the characteristics of the winners and losers of their application are presented, 
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Mexico has achieved remarkable progress in education and has resumed its advance, after 
faltering in the second half of the eighties. Still, it faces major education deficits in basic education 
whose resolution has become complicated by the policy of decentralization and increasing post-
compulsory education demands. Addressing these deficits fully would require resources far 
beyond what would be available in the foreseeable future; solving them would need a clear 
definition of priorities and a long-term strategic perspective.  
 
Educational equity and productivity under a decentralizing system, however, can be advanced 
through a series of measures such as  I) ensuring basic education a high share of public 
education spending and restructuring the distribution of post-compulsory education benefits. II) 
Establishing a more equitable and efficient system of distributing education transfers among and 
within states. III) Experimenting with state performance incentives based on both student 
enrollment and learning. IV) Instituting an effective accountability framework based on outputs or 
performance. V) Developing a culture of evaluation and openness to public scrutiny. VI) 
Strengthening of Federal support for intrastate development; and using poverty alleviation and 
social assistance programs as levers for advancing the education of poor, rural and indigenous 
children.  
 
This paper is limited to addressing questions of interstate allocation of Federal education 
transfers that can be used more effectively in promoting equity, efficiency and resource 
mobilization. 
 
Prior to the recent 1998 budgetary changes, interstate allocation of Federal transfers for basic 
education lacked transparent and firm rules for allocating educational transfers among competing 
states: bilateral negotiations with Federal Government was the practice. This allocation has given 
little discretionary authority to the States, which has been linked to inputs (predominantly number 
of teachers) rather than outputs. It has lacked state’s accountability and incentives for 
performance.  
 
In 1998, the Government adopted a formula-driven system of allocating Federal Education 
transfers to states and gave them a lot of autonomy in using those resources.  Under the new 
methodology, states get at least the same amount (adjusted for inflation) as the previous year’s; 
and budgetary increments based on the number of needed schools and teachers. These changes 
are huge improvements in the transparency and decentralization of education resource allocation.  
But, even with these changes, equity and efficiency issues in interstate allocation of Federal 
education transfers remain important.  This is since past distribution patterns persist and, hence,   3
inequities remain as the current formula depends almost totally on past year’s allocation. States’ 
accountability and incentives for performance and local contribution to education finance remain 
weak, if not absent.  
 
This paper shows that three formulae appear promising for the purpose of establishing an 
improved formula-driven interstate and intrastate allocation: i) uniform per student formula: 
simplest and most transparent; rewards enrollment, but does not explicitly address differential 
needs of states. II) Productivity adjusted per student formula: maximizes enrollment impact by 
giving more to states with high enrollment elasticity to subsidy; no equity assurance but at this 
stage of Mexico’s development, it can be favorable to disadvantaged states since they now tend 
to have higher enrollment elasticities. And III) multi-component formula: divides total transfers into 
(a) core fund to be distributed on a per student basis; and (b) supplementary fund for extra cost of 
improving education of selected groups of disadvantaged children (poor, indigenous, rural).  This  
formula requires more information and is more complex; but it has the flexibility for ensuring a 
balance between efficiency and equity.  
 
Simulations show that adoption of any of the above formulae would tend to improve distribution in 
favor of low income and educationally lagging states.  
 
This paper is organized as follow: Section II introduces the three competing formulas. Section III 
discusses  the simulations. Section IV has the conclusions. 
 
II.-On the Allocation of Federal Education Transfers Among States 
 
1  Uniform per student allocation 
This is the simplest, most transparent method.  The criticism of it is that it takes into account 
neither the differential resource needs of states nor their relative productivity.  A simulated 
application of this formula reveals, however, that its use can in fact improve the current situation 
in regard to equity (see below).  Moreover, the formula is promising as far as long-run productivity 
improvement is concerned, because it rewards and, hence, encourages greater enrollment. 
 
The formula applies a simple distribution of federal resources in direct proportion to the number of 
eligible students in a state, i.e., the population of children of school-going age.  The application of 
the formula involves following a simple sequence. 
 
1.  Step 1 :Take the estimate of school-going age children for each state. For illustrative 
purposes, it is used the 12 to 14 Age-group estimates provided by CONAPO. 
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2.  Step 2 : Compute the share of each state i in the national population of the children of school-
going age. This paper used the national population of 12 to 14 years old, as computed by 
CONAPO. 
 
Pop. Share of State i =  (Population of 12-14 Age in State i) / (National Pop. of 12-14 Age) 
 
3.  Step 3 : Multiply the total available funds for transfers to states with the respective population 
shares computed in Step 2 to arrive at each state’s share of federal transfers.  This paper used 
the Total Federal transfers for Secondary Education provided by SEP. 
 
 
FORMULA 2  Productivity adjusted allocation 
 
The impact of Federal education transfers in increasing enrollments differs among states.  It can 
be shown that under this situation, if the Government is aiming at maximizing enrollment, it 
should adjust the per student formula by factors reflecting the elasticity of enrollment with respect 
to the Federal subsidy of one state relative to that of another.  The uniform per-student allocation 
formula is a special case that is obtained if the elasticities are uniform for all states.  Lopez-
Acevedo (1999a) shows that differences in enrollment elasticity among states can be significant 
at lower secondary education (see table 1 in the annex ).
 1 It also shows that given the current 
pattern of coverage, states which lag behind in enrollment rate and income tend to have higher 
elasticities.  This implies that under this formula those lagging states would be given relatively 
more Federal transfers per child. In other words, the states with the lowest enrollment rates are 
likely to show the largest gains for each additional peso of federal subsidy and thus should be 
favored, if higher overall enrollments and assistance to poorer states are the goals.  Efficiency 
and equity objectives coincide. Thus Formula  2 adds an adjustment to the Formula 1 allocation 
based on the number of potential students in a state.  
 
1.  It can be shown that enrollment is maximized if a state is allocated an amount that is 
proportional to its enrollment elasticity with respect to federal education spending.  That is, a state 
i with an enrollment elasticity that is twice that of state j should be given twice as much money.  
Enrollment elasticity here refers to the percentage change in enrollment per percentage increase 
in Federal education spending per child.  The amount of transfers to be allocated to a state i for a 
given total budget, following the above concept, can be computed using the following steps. 
 
1.  Step 1.  Get estimates of enrollment elasticity for each state  i  (ALPHAi). 
 
                                                           
1 
✩  Based on Probits of Enrollment of Secondary School Aged Children using ENIGH 1994.  The elasticity used is the 
highest in the range of elasticties across the Mexican states - states with elasticity of a similar magnitude included 
Guerrero, Hidalgo, Nayarit and San Luis Potosí. Note that these are point elasticities, evaluated at the mean of federal 
transfers and enrollment probability for each state, but in the estimation of additional funding, the elasticity is assumed 
to be constant over the 10% and 20% intervals used as the two scenarios.   5
2.  Step 2.  Compute the relative magnitude of the enrollment elasticity in state i (RALPHi) in 
relation to that of a “reference state”.  That is, RALPHi is equal to ALPHAi divided by the ALPHA 
of the reference state (Distrito Federal in this paper). 
 
3.  Step 3.  Divide the given total amount of Federal transfer for the relevant educational level by 
total enrolment to get per student Federal expenditure  for the country as a whole (EXPT). 
 
4.  Step 4.  Define  ZETAi  =  RALPHi * SHAREi and ZETAT =  the sum of ZETAi over all states i 
except the “reference state”. 
 
where SHAREi is the share of state i in total enrollment for the relevant educational level”. 
 
5.  Step 5.  Compute for the amount of transfers that should be allocated to state i (EXPi) using 
the following equation: 
 
EXPi =  (ZETAT / EXPT)* RALPHi  
 
 
FORMULA 3  Multi-component method 
 
The approach here is to divide the budget for purposes of calculation into several parts, 
depending on government’s policy interest.  In a two component model, the budget is divided into 
two parts: core and supplementary funds.  The core fund is divided according to number of 
students as in (a) above.  Supplementary funds, on the other, are allocated in accordance with 
the number of children with special needs multiplied by the extra cost per student of meeting 
those needs.  This need-based approach is currently used in New Zealand, Victoria (Australia) 
and other countries to allocate their education budget among schools.  In the Mexican context, 
supplementary funding could be based on the number of rural, indigenous, and poor children 
residing in a state.  As mentioned, econometric analyses of Mexican data strongly suggest that 
doing so would improve not only equity but also efficiency. 
 
Although the calculation is based on various components and sub-components, it does not 
necessarily mean that these funds should be earmarked to finance those individual components.  
In fact, as argued below, giving each state those funds as a global budget or block grant could be 
more efficient.  Hence, it is probably better to allow the states to use the grant as they see fit, for 
as long as it is used for basic education purposes, and they are held accountable for delivery of 
clearly specified monitorable outputs. 
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1.  The formula has two components.  The first is the base or core funding component, which 
applies to all students and is distributed among states using uniform per student allocation as in 
Formula 1.  The second is the supplemental component consisting of additional funding to states, 
depending on the population of special groups which are in need of additional resources to 
compensate for the cost of reducing their disadvantages relative to the average group of children.  
2.  Three special groups are considered here :  Rural, Poor, and Indigenous.  Note that these 
groups are not mutually exclusive, so that groups such as poor indigenous people living in rural 
areas are accounted for by the allocation mechanism. It is assumed here that the extent to which 
a child is disadvantaged depends cumulatively on the number of unfavorable conditions he is in.  
 
The distribution of a given total supplemental funding among states is computed as follows. 
 
3.  Step 1.  Determine the number of rural (RURi), indigenous (INDi) and poor (POORi) children 
in each state i. 
 
4.  Step 2.  Estimate the per student cost of removing the learning achievement disparity 
associated with the child’s disadvantaged conditions. Denote this compensatory unit cost as 
CCOSTj for each unfavorable condition j (1= rural, 2 = indigenous, 3 = poor).  Assume that this 
unit cost is the same for all states. 
 
5.  Step 3.  The unconstrained extra amount of resources (EXTRAi) needed by a state i to 
reduce the learning gap caused by these three sources of disadvantage can be estimated as 
 
EXTRAi = CCOST1*RURi + CCOST2*INDi + CCOST3*POORi 
 
6.  Step 4.  Calculate EXTRAT = the SUM of EXTRAi over all states i.  This is likely to show that 
the total extra resources needed is greater than the total available supplemental 
budget.(SUPBUD).  This budget can be prorated on the basis of the compensatory need of a 
state relative to the total. 
 
7.  Step 5.  To do this, define the relative need of state i for extra resources as 
 
RNEEDi = EXTRAi / EXTRAT 
 
8.  Step 6.  The prorated supplemental amount for state i (PROXTRA) for a given SUPBUD can 
simply be calculated as 
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PROXTRA = RNEEDi * SUPBUD 
 
In the report’s simulation, SUPBUD is assumed to be 22 percent of total federal transfers for 
primary education. 
 
III.- Simulations and Results 
 
The first simulation (Table 1 ) asks the question:  What would be the pattern of allocation of 
Federal transfers for lower secondary education among states, if Formula I (uniform per-student 
or capitation method) were used, and how would it compare with the actual allocation? To answer 
this question, the states were classified into three categories, depending on the size of their net 
gain per student.  Category I consists of states with large losses, while Category III is composed 
of the big gainers.  The middle category is a group of relatively small negative and positive 
gainers.  A similar exercise was undertaken, using Formula II (productivity adjusted formula).  
Enrollment elasticities with respect to per child transfers were computed for each state, using 
probit regression equations (see table 1 in the appendix), 
 
TABLE 1   Net Gainers from Formula 1 (Per Child)   
 
Average Net Gain  Per Capita State  
Category  (1993 Pesos)  GDP (1993 Pesos) 
 
High Net Gainers  353 1,041 
 
Medium Net Gainers/Losers 18 1,081 
 
High Net Losers  -474 2,062 
 
The results indicate that contrary to the usual concern previously mentioned, application of a 
uniform per-student formula in Mexico would tend to redistribute Federal transfers from high to 
low income states. This outcome is even more pronounced in Formula II  as shown below.  
TABLE 2  Net Gainers from Formula 2 (Per Child)   
 
Average Net Gain  Per Capita State  
Category  (1993 Pesos)  GDP (1993 Pesos) 
 
High Net Gainers  499 871 
 
Medium Net Gainers/Losers -32 1,150 
 
High Net Losers  -729 2,559 
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The implication is that since by design Formula II gives more to states whose enrollment elasticity 
is higher, equity and efficiency objectives coincide, as earlier hypothesized. To illustrate how the 
multi-component formula (Formula III) can be applied in a situation where learning achievement 
has become the predominant concern instead of access, the issue of interstate allocation of 
primary education Federal transfers was chosen.   
 
In the present application of Formula III, it is necessary to determine the split between core and 
supplementary funding.  A practical approach is to use the current percentage of total budget 
allocated to special programs for these disadvantaged groups of children.  In Mexico in 1995, that 
would be about 22 percent at the primary level, which is what the Federal Government more or 
less spent for special education programs for rural and indigenous children.  It is also necessary 
to estimate what the “extra cost” per student of the special needs of those children.  In general, 
the “extra cost” consists of the extra costs of (a) providing access to these children and (b) 
overcoming their learning disadvantages.  In the current exercise, only the “extra cost” per 
student of the above disadvantaged groups is being considered.  Finally, to estimate the number 
of poor children, the marginality index of CONAPO was used, since it is not possible to get state-
specific poverty rates based on income 
 
The simulation first calculates the supplementary funding requirement of each state, applying the 
same parameters described in table 2 (in the appendix) to the number of rural, indigenous, and 
poor children living in each of the 31 states.  It then sums up the total supplementary fund 
required and calculates its percentage distribution among states. Using this distribution, the 
budget for compensatory programs (22 percent of primary education Federal transfers) is 
accordingly divided among the states. 
 
The simulation results presented in Table 3 clearly show that like the other formulae, Formula III 
would also improve equity. The tendency is for the rich states to lose, and the poor states to 
gain. Analysis of the educational characteristics of the winners and losers further reveals that the 
biggest gainers tend to be states that are lagging behind the biggest losers in terms of primary 
terminal efficiency rates and gross lower secondary enrollment rates (Table 5).  With respect to 
learning achievement test scores, there are no clear patterns.  This probably because, as noted, 
interstate differences in student test scores are small, (Lopez Acevedo,1999c). 
 
Application of Formulae I and II at the primary level would mean losses of about 2.25 billion 
(1998) pesos for 17 to 19 states (Table 4). At the secondary level, use of Formula III would lead 
to losses of about  3.61 billion for 21 states. These figures indicate the size of the adjustment that   9
needs to be made by the losers and the amount of assistance that they would require to ease the 
transition.  
 
TABLE 3   Net Gainers from Formula 3 (Per Student)   
 
Average Net Gain  Per Capita State  
Category  (1993 Pesos)  GDP (1993 Pesos) 
 
High Net Gainers  227 967 
 
Medium Net Gainers/Losers  -59 1,135 
 




TABLE 4   Losses of Losers  
  All losers  Big Losers  Actual 
spending in 
1997  











        
  Formula I  2.23  19  1.43  6  24 
  Formula II  2.25  17  1.86  6  24 
Primary          
   Formula III  3.61  21  2.53  8  44 
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Table 5:  Educational Characteristics of Net Gainers 
 
  Primary: Terminal Efficiency rate 
(%) 
Lower Secondary: gross enrollment 
rate (%) 













Formula I  90.0  77.6  80  84.6  69.4  69.2 
Formula II  92.3  80.1  77.3  91  70.3  69.1 
Formula III  86.7  84.6  73.6 88.4  71.2  68.1 
 
Two observations should be made at this point.  First, even with the changes introduced by the 
government in the way Federal transfers are allocated, the need for improving the current 
allocation formula remains an important issue.  The reason for this is that because the new 
methodology uses mainly an “inertial formula” (that is, states get at least the same amount of 
allocation as the previous year’s, adjusted for the rate of inflation), past inequities tend to persist.  
Moreover, giving States budgetary increments based on the number of new schools and teachers 
needed tends to penalize more effective resource users and, hence, undermine efficiency.  The 
second observation is that at present individual States have yet to confront the issue of intrastate 
allocation.  Application of the above methodologies to this issue can be useful. 
 
III.- Conclusions 
The above formulae can be criticized in that while they clearly provide incentives for increased 
enrollment, they do not similarly reward quality of education.  Hence, it might be argued that 
student learning might be undermined as a consequence.  The size of this effect is not known 
empirically.  Such concern, however, should not prevent the use of the formulae just because it is 
not perfect.  The formulae should be compared with the existing practice which neither rewards 
enrollment nor learning outcomes. 
 
In theory, such concern can be dealt with by adding a third component to the calculation of the 
budget.  This component would fund rewards to states according to student learning 
improvements gained during some specified time period.  Even with this type of incentive system, 
there is concern too that it would be unfair to states with relatively more disadvantaged children.  
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The assumption of this argument is that the rate of improvement would be more difficult to 
achieve among poor states, putting them at a competitive disadvantage.  But this concern is 
attenuated by the fact that by design states would get more supplementary funds the greater their 
number of disadvantaged children.  Besides, empirical results from PARE (Lopez-Acevedo, 
1999c) indicate that intervention programs like it have produced rates of improvement among 
children with initially low learning achievement (specifically, indigenous students) that were 
remarkably higher than the average student.  
 
The incentive system can also be designed so that the reward is earmarked for each specific 
state and kept until it has reached agreed benchmarks.  This system could be combined with 
another approach that links rewards to number of graduates.  The problem here, though, is that it 
is an incentive for passing students at lower learning standards.  But this can be addressed by 
instituting some kind of Federal examination system in which graduates would be assessed, 
using national standardized tests. States would be rewarded for every graduate who passes the 
examination.  
 
The above discussion point to the idea that a reasonable system of performance incentives 
based on learning outcomes for states can be developed.  It will not be a simple task. It requires 
systematic experimentation. But it is worth a try. 
 
Finally, there is the idea of using matching grants as an approach for allocating Federal transfers.  
This is often proposed as a method for providing incentives to states to allocate more of their 
budget to improve basic education.  This is an important issue to consider in light of the need to 
mobilize additional resources for the education sector and the decline in states’ contribution to its 
finance.  The use of matching grants, however, should be used carefully.  First, if used alone, 
matching grants could widen inequality in education finance.  Second, the approach suffers from 
the same criticisms mentioned above about the use of input-based incentives and allocation 
formula.  Focusing on rewarding states’ outputs, as proposed above, would be a better approach 
because it would implicitly reward states that are able to achieve output benchmarks regardless 
of whether they did it through increased efficiency or  mobilization of additional resources (both 
monetary and in-kind). Still, used within a broader equity-oriented resource allocation framework 
(e.g. the above multi-component formula), special matching grants program can be a useful tool 
for motivating local resource mobilization.  To be effective, though, subnational governments 
should have ample authority to levy local resources.  This issue, which could involved fiscal 
mechanisms, will have to be examined in the context of the government’s new federalism 
approach to governance.  




The table presents the elasticity of the probability of enrollment in Secondary School with respect 
to the amount of federal transfers made to a state for Secondary Schools divided by the 
population of Secondary School aged children in the state. The states are ranked according to a 
descending order of federal transfers per child.  
 
Table 1.- Enrollment Rate Elasticity Relative Federal  
Transfers Per Child: Lower Secondary 
 
State  GDP/person  Elasticity 
Hidalgo  8.89 0.14 
San Luis Potosi  9.50 0.137 
Guerrero  8.02 0.132 
Nayarit  9.65 0.131 
Zacatecas  6.93 0.107 
Oaxaca de Juarez  6.10 0.107 
Queretaro  13.67 0.107 
Campeche  30.45 0.106 
Durango  9.88 0.096 
Quintana Roo  24.89 0.093 
Tabasco  10.01 0.092 
Yucatan  9.87 0.09 
Puebla  8.21 0.088 
Morelos  13.81 0.086 
Tamaulipas  12.16 0.081 
Veracruz  8.45 0.079 
Tlaxcala  7.63 0.078 
Michoacan de Ocampo  6.92 0.074 
Coahuila  15.27 0.072 
Colima  15.76 0.067 
Chiapas  5.89 0.062 
Baja California Sur  14.96 0.061 
Guanajuato  9.35 0.06 
Aguas Calientes  12.59 0.06 
Chihuahua  12.62 0.057 
Sinaloa  10.91 0.057 
Sonora  15.29 0.047 
Baja California Norte  14.37 0.046 
Mexico  10.89 0.045 
Jalisco  13.05 0.038 
Nueva Leon  22.12 0.035 
Distrito Federal  33.71 0.024 
National  average  13.08 0.073   13
 
Table 2 Supplementary Funds Needed for Extra Cost of Improving Education of 




Target  Number of 
Students 
Assumptions  Funding 
Needed 
✇   
1997 
Budget 
✇   
           
(1) Closing 















  a. Scenario 1  Rural 31%, 
Indigenous 
44%, Poor 30% 
  2.95 




  b. Scenario 2   Rural 31%, 
Indigenous 
44%,Poor  15% 
  2.95 




           






Rate from a 
base of 55 % 
by 
  Elasticity of 
probability of 
enrollment 









  a. Scenario 1  20 percent 
(Summit of 
Americas Goal) 
  0.14 




  b. Scenario 2  10 percent    0.14 





                                                           
✇    In  Constant 1994 Pesos, using CPI deflator from the Banco de México.  
 
Ψ  Based on Education Production Function Analysis of PARE program in 5 Mexican states :- Hidalgo, Mixoacan, .... 
 
✩  Based on Probits of Enrollment of Secondary School Aged Children using ENIGH 1994. The elasticity used is the 
highest in the range of elasticties across the Mexican states - states with elasticity of a similar magnitude included 
Guerrero, Hidalgo, Nayarit and San Luis Potosí. Note that these are point elasticities, evaluated at the mean of federal 
transfers and enrollment probability for each state, but in the estimation of additional funding, the elasticity is assumed 
to be constant over the 10% and 20% intervals used as the two scenarios. 
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